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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
THE ESTATE OF PAUL STEED, : 
through its administratrix 
MARY KAZAN, : RESPONDENT'S REPLY BRIEF 
: TO APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR 
Plaintiff/Appellant, : REHEARING 
vs. : 
: Case No 890426 
NEW ESCALANTE IRRIGATION : 
COMPANY, : 
Defendant/Respondent. : 
Defendant/Respondent (defendant) submi|ts this brief at the 
invitation of the Court and in response to plaintiff's Petition for 
Rehearing. 
The Petition presents nothing new. Plaidtiff chooses to ignore 
the findings of the trial court and it c|hooses to ignore the 
substantial body of law from this Court that clearly cuts against 
plaintiff's position. All the Petition does is re-hash plaintiff's 
arguments made on appeal, which both the tri^l court and this Court 
unequivocally rejected. 
The primary issue is whether or not uncler the facts as found 
by the trial court, plaintiff has a vested right in defendant's 
waste water such that it can require defendant to maintain the 
historic level of waste water contribution tcf Alvey Wash. Utah law 
is settled on this issue, and this Court h^s uniformly resolved 
this issue against plaintiff's position. 
Plaintiff simply does not like that Result. It therefore 
argues that the Court should be more "enlightened." Plaintiff says 
that an "enlightened" Court would disregard decades of well-
reasoned precedent and impose an equitable remedy. However, the 
equity plaintiff seeks would be beneficial only to plaintiff. It 
would boot strap plaintiff's 1909 priority water right in the 
erratic flows of Alvey Wash into a reliable water right in the 
Escalante River with a priority equal to or superior to defendant's 
1875 priority right in the Escalante River. It would require 
defendant to commit capacity in its pipelines in order to deliver 
defendant's water to plaintiff, to the exclusion of defendant's 
shareholders who paid for the system. The water would have to be 
carried in the pipeline, as that is the only way to get water to 
Alvey Wash now that the historic ditches and canals have been 
abandoned and replaced with the pressurized sprinkler system. That 
would deprive defendant and its shareholders of the benefits of its 
two million dollar investment in its sprinkler system. Plaintiff's 
recommended solution would confer a substantially better water 
right on plaintiff than it in fact owns, and better than it could 
acquire under the appropriation doctrine as an appropriator of 
waste water. Plaintiff would benefit, but at the sole expense of 
defendant. Such a result would be most inequitable to defendant 
and its shareholders. 
Defendant has a legal right to conserve and more efficiently 
utilize its water supply through the recapture and reuse of its 
waste and seepage water. As the Court noted in its opinion, the 
conservation of water is not a new idea in the West. Irrigators 
have been constructing storage reservoirs since irrigation began in 
2 
order to conserve the early spring flows off mountain streams for 
use later in the irrigation season. Irrigators have lined their 
canals and destroyed water loving vegetatioh along ditch banks to 
minimize seepage losses. This Court has consistently upheld the 
right of the water user to do this.1 Irrigating with sprinkler 
systems is neither a new idea or new technology. Sprinkler 
irrigation has been actively used in the West} for at least the past 
30 years. It is merely another form of conservation. A closed 
pipeline system reduces seepage and evaporation losses which occur 
in open ditch conveyance systems. Defendant [has the legal right to 
employ conservation measures that enable it tlo use water previously 
lost to seepage and waste. This is in keeping with the established 
public policy of this state. 
Contrary to plaintiff's assertions, plaintiff is not a lower 
water use on the same source of supply as aeiendant. Instead, it 
owns a water right that has as its source of supply water 
originating in a separate and distinct natu|ral drainage known as 
Alvey Wash. The Court found there to be |io natural connection 
between the Alvey Wash and the Escalante Rilver above plaintiff's 
point of diversion. Therefore, the only way Escalante River water 
reaches plaintiff's land is for defendant to divert water from the 
Escalante River under its rights; for the defendant to convey that 
water through its irrigation system to the lands of its 
^iq Cottonwood Tanner Ditch v. Moyle, L09 Utah 213, 289 P. 
116 (1930). 
2Wayman v. Murray City Corp., 23 Utah 2Jd 97, 458 P.2d 861, 
863 (1969). 
3 
shareholders; and, for its shareholders to apply the water to their 
lands, some of which drain toward the Alvey Wash. The fact that 
Alvey Wash is a tributary to the Escalante River is of absolutely 
no consequence here, since the confluence of these streams is some 
25 miles downstream and below defendant's point of diversion. 
If plaintiff's land were located below the confluence of the 
Escalante River and Alvey Wash and plaintiff's established point of 
diversion were on the river, its source of supply would then be the 
Escalante River and not Alvey Wash. As an appropriator of water 
from the same source as defendant, plaintiff would have a call on 
all sources of supply up-stream from its point of diversion. It 
could therefore enjoin changes of use upstream that would 
unreasonably interfere with its vested water rights. 
That simply is not the case here. Plaintiff owns no water 
rights that have their source of supply in the Escalante River. 
Plaintiff's water source is Alvey Wash. The flow of Alvey Wash has 
been augmented by the waste water seeping through the ground and 
running off the land of defendant's shareholders into Alvey Wash. 
This seepage and waste water is not part of the natural flows of 
Alvey Wash but is water that has been artificially brought into 
Alvey Wash drainage by the efforts and expenditures of defendant. 
As such, plaintiff simply has no vested rights against defendant to 
require the same level of waste water to Alvey Wash. 
3Colleqe Irr. Co. v. Logan River & Blacksmith Fork Irr. Co., 
780 P.2d 1241 (1989). 
4 
Plaintiff argues that the location of ^he point of diversion 
should make no difference because Alvey W^sh and the Escalante 
River are part of the same river system. Plaintiff's observation 
simply begs the question. All streams are tributary to some other 
stream. For example, the Escalante River ailid Alvey Wash are both 
tributaries of the Colorado River. However, that fact does not 
entitle plaintiff to have water imported t0 Alvey Wash from the 
Green River simply because they are part of the larger Colorado 
River system. 
Under the doctrine of prior appropriation, the location of the 
point of diversion is a critical element o£ the water right, as 
that defines the source or sources of supply upon which an 
appropriator may rely in satisfaction of his vested right. The law 
of prior appropriation does not and cannot t4ke Plaintiff's global 
approach to this issue. Plaintiff nevertheless asks this Court to 
ignore the source of supply component of plaintiff's water right 
and in equity to shift its appropriated water right from the 
ephemeral flows of Alvey Wash to the relative security of the 
Escalante River and then require defendant to deliver that water to 
plaintiff through defendant's irrigation system. Such a rule would 
erode the foundational under-pinnings of the doctrin^  of prior appropriation. 
Plaintiff perceives the Court's decision to be harsh, but the 
rule is no more harsh than the doctrine of prior appropriation 
itself. The doctrine is not one of equity. It is a doctrine of 
property rights, and its guiding principle id first in time, first 
in right. That principle assures those who are first in time that 
5 
they may satisfy their rights in full before subsequent 
appropriators may divert any water in satisfaction of their junior 
rights. In times of shortage, the junior appropriator may get 
nothing at all. That may not be equitable, but that is the nature 
of the water right the junior appropriator acquired. A junior 
appropriator cannot invoke equity to force a senior appropriator to 
share water with him during shortages any more than Plaintiff 
should be able to invoke equity to force defendant to continue 
making waste water available to plaintiff in Alvey Wash. 
Plaintiff has used defendant's waste and seepage water while 
it was available to plaintiff, and it has reappropriated this 
water. Plaintiff has acquired a vested right as against other 
water users of Alvey Wash. However, plaintiff's appropriated right 
in this waste water is not like a normal appropriated water right, 
in that it does not give plaintiff a vested right against defendant 
to compel defendant to continue wasting water for plaintiff's 
benefit.4 Plaintiff does have a decreed water right in Alvey Wash 
but like the decree involved in Lasson v. Seeley,5 the decree does 
4Hutchins, The Law of Water Rights, pp. 362-368, wherein he 
states that where the waste water goes to another channel it is 
open to reappropriation: 
These waste-water appropriations, however, are not vested with 
all the attributes of a true appropriative right, for it appears 
to be settled that the waste-water claimant does not thereby 
acquire, solely by virtue of such appropriation, a vested right 
as against the original appropriator to have the practice of 
wasting water for his particular benefit continue. . . . " 
(emphasis added). 
5
 120 Utah 679, 238 P.2d 4185, 422-23, (1951). 
not compel defendant to waste water to Alvey Wash in satisfaction 
of plaintiff's water rights. 
Still plaintiff argues that the waste ^na seepage water cases 
are "old" law. It contends the court should abandon this "old" 
precedent and find a more "enlightened," Equitable remedy. The 
"old" law is squarely on point with the facts in this case and it 
is the controlling law. Further, this fold" rule of law is 
actively being applied throughout the West even today,6 in cases 
that address the efforts of upstream appropriators to conserve 
water by implementing conservation measures 
Plaintiff is not a lower user of water from the same stream as 
defendant, but is instead the reappropriator of defendant's waste 
and seepage water that artificially reaches Alvey Wash. Under the 
controlling rule of law, plaintiff has acquired no vested right as 
against defendant, by appropriation, by adverse use, or otherwise, 
to compel defendant or its shareholders, to continue to let the 
same amount of waste water run off or seep and percolate through 
the ground water table from their lands into Alvey Wash for 
plaintiff's benefit.7 Defendant has the legal right to use its 
water more efficiently. If that effort deprives plaintiff of some 
of the water it has used in the past that is unfortunate, but 
6e.q. Department of Ecology v. U. S. Bureau of Reclamation, 
827 P.2d 275 (Wash. 1992); Arizona Public Service Co. v. Long, 
160 Ariz. 429, 773 P.2d 988 (1989); Hidden Springs Trout Ranch, 
Inc. v. Hagerman Water Users, Inc., 101 Id. 617, 619 P.2d 1130 
(1980). 
7East Bench Irr. Co. v. Deseret Irr. Co.f2 Utah 2d 170, 271 
P.2d 449 (1954). "~ 
7 
plaintiff has no legal right to complain, for such is the nature of 
a re-appropriator's interest in the waste and seepage water of 
another. 
Plaintiff nevertheless contends that since the sprinkler 
irrigation is more efficient, that there must be a "savings" of 
water in which plaintiff, in equity, should be entitled to share. 
Again, both the evidence and the trial Court's findings are to the 
contrary. 
The trial court found that a sprinkler system is approximately 
25% more efficient than flood type irrigation. (Finding 21, R. 
331). This finding was based on expert testimony. Engineer Fred 
Duberow testified that the sprinkler system does not make water, 
but because of the more efficient application of the water, the 
crops consume more. With flood-type irrigation the plants at the 
upper end are over-watered, and the lower areas are under-watered. 
Sprinklers provide for a more even application so that all crops 
are watered uniformly. This results in better utilization of the 
water. There is less waste because the once under-watered plants 
now consume what they need. 
Plaintiff implies that the conversion to sprinklers has 
resulted in 100% of the water diverted by the defendant being 
consumed. This is surely not the case. The court found that 
sprinklers are only 25% more efficient, not 100% more efficient 
than flood irrigation. Therefore, some of the water applied to the 
land still is unconsumed and would find its way to Alvey Wash from 
those lands that drain that direction. 
8 
Plaintiff then argues that since there has been a savings of 
water, defendant must have used this "savied" water to make an 
unauthorized expansion of its irrigated acreage. Once again 
neither the evidence, nor the trial Court's findings, support 
plaintiff's assertions. The Court found that after 1952 the 
defendant filed and perfected new applicatioris to appropriate water 
from the Escalante River. At the time of trial, defendant had the 
right to irrigate up to 2,712.28 acres under its various perfected 
water rights in the river. The trial Court ^lso found that at the 
time of trial defendant Irrigation Company wa^ s irrigating less than 
2,700 acres. Thus, contrary to plaintiff's assertions, defendant 
is operating well within its water rights. 
Plaintiff then argues that this Court threw out the 
distinction between the return of water to th^ stream from which it 
was diverted, as opposed to the flow of seepage or waste water to 
a foreign drainage in its decision in Ea^t Bench Irr. Co. v. 
Deseret Irr. Co.,.8 In this regard, plaintmi simply misreads the 
decision, for the Court clearly preserved thi^ critical distinction 
in the law. 
In East Bench, the upstream appropriato^s had filed a change 
application to change their points of diversion to move their 
direct flow rights in the river into storage The Court cited the 
waste water cases9 that were being relied on by the upstream 
82 Utah 2d 170, 271 P.2d 449 (1954). 
9Smithfield West Bench Irrigation Co. ^s. Union Central 
Life Insurance Co., et al., 105 Utah 468, 142 P.2d 866 (1943), 
and 113 Utah 356, 195 P.2d 249 (1948), Lassofr v. Seeley, 120 Utah 
9 
appropriators in support of their contention that they had the 
right to completely consume all of the water they diverted by using 
it over and over again. 
The Court in East Bench distinguished the waste water cases 
from the situation then before the Court by noting that they did 
not involve the rights of upper and lower water users on the same 
natural stream. Said the Court: 
There [where the waste water did not return to the 
stream from which it was diverted] the waters in question 
were originally diverted by an upper canal company and 
reached the lower users' lands only through that means 
after they had been abandoned but before they had reached 
the stream from which they were originally diverted. It 
is generally recognized that such lower user, even though 
he may by appropriation acquire the right to use such 
waters as reach his lands from such source, either 
directly from the higher lands or through a natural water 
channel, [which would include the ground water table] can 
acquire no right to have the upper user divert and bring 
such water onto the upper user's land from where it will 
become available for the irrigation of the lower user's 
land before it reaches the stream from which it was 
originally diverted. The upper user in such case owed the 
lower user no obligation to bring such water to him; he 
could abandon the diversion from the stream altogether 
and thereby deprive the lower user of all of such waste 
or surplus water. Under such conditions the lower user 
can acquire no vested right against the upper user who 
first diverted the water from the natural stream and 
brought it to him either by appropriation, adverse user, 
estoppel, acquiescence or other means, to compel him to 
continue such practice. But a lower user of the water of 
a [same] natural stream [or source of supply], as we have 
seen, acquires a vested right as against all upper users 
[of water in the same water source] that they shall not 
increase the amount of water consumed after he makes his 
appropriation by a change of place of diversion or place 
or manner of use and thereby deprive him of the use of 
such water, (emphasis added) 
679, 238 P.2d 418 (1951),and McNaughton v. Eaton, 121 Utah 394, 
242 P.2d 570 (1952). 
10 
This rule is consistent with a long line of cases from this Court 
and the many treatises upon which this Coiiirt has relied on and 
quoted at length in its numerous opinions.10 
Plaintiff also contends that neither* the McNaughton11 or 
Stubbs12 cases support the decision of the Cckirt. Plaintiff again 
misreads these cases. In McNaughton ther£ was a natural wash 
adjacent to irrigated land. Some water accumulated therein from 
natural sources. Sometimes excess water (ekcess to the needs of 
the shareholders) was diverted by the canal company from other 
sources under its rights, and this exces$ water was released 
directly into the natural wash. Also, wfcste water which had 
previously been used to irrigate lands on bpth sides of the wash 
drained into the wash above plaintiff's poiht of diversion. The 
Court squarely held that all three of these water sources (the 
natural flows, the excess water and the wastte water) were subject 
to reappropriation from the wash, again citing, with approval, the 
above discussion by Hutchins.13 The Court then held that the 
re-appropriator acquired no right as against the original 
10Garns v. Rollins, 41 Utah 260, 125 P. 1867 (1912); 
Smithfield West Bench Irrigation Co. vs. Union Central Life 
Insurance Co., et al., 105 Utah 468, 142 P.2d 866 (1943), 
rehearing, 113 Utah 356, 195 P.2d 249 (1948), Lasson v. Seeley, 
120 Utah 679, 238 P.2d 418 (1951); and McNaughton v. Eaton, 121 
Utah 394, 242 P.2d 570 (1952); Hutchins, The] Law of Water Rights. 
362-368; See also Samuel Weil, Water Rights in the Western 
States,, 3d ed. p. 50.(1905). f 
n121 Utah 394, 242 P.2d 570 (1952). 
1213 Utah 2d. 45, 368 P.2d 461 (1962). 
Supra. note 4. 
11 
appropriator to have the waste water continue to escape to the 
wash. The issue was also presented in Stubbs v. Ercanbrack,14 where 
the Court stated that: 
...the waters produced in these drains are not waste waters as 
referred to in the usual sense, nor did the trial Court find 
them to be such. It did find that they resulted both from the 
irrigation of the defendant's higher ground and from the 
underlying water table. We are quite in harmony with the idea 
that water rights could not be acquired in waste water so that 
the defendant would be obliged to continue to irrigate his 
higher ground to provide water to be collected in the 
plaintiffs' drains. . . . (Emphasis added) 
Thus, this Court has held in an unbroken line of cases 
starting with Gams v. Rollins,15 in 1912, that the party who 
diverts and uses seepage and waste water that has artificially been 
introduced into his water shed above his point of diversion, may 
use and even reappropriate this waste water. However, that 
re-appropriator acquires no vested rights against the original 
appropriator of this waste or seepage water so as to compel the 
upstream appropriator to continue to waste this water for his 
benefit. This is the established law in Utah and throughout the 
West. It is a rule of law based upon the origin or the source of 
supply of water that is naturally available to an appropriator at 
his or her established point of diversion. It is a rule of law 
that makes sense and should not be disturbed by the arbitrary 
application of equity. 
Plaintiff asserts yet again that defendant should have filed 
a change application to convert from flood irrigation to sprinkler 
1413 Utah 2d. 45, 50, 368 P.2d 461 (1962). 
1541 Utah 260, 125 P. 867 (1912). 
12 
irrigation. That is not the law in Utah, nor in any other 
appropriation doctrine state. The first change application 
legislation was enacted in 1903 as a part of the original water 
code. Although the statute has been amended from time to time, it 
has required the filing of a change application in only three 
specified situations: (1) Where there is a change in point of 
diversion from the source of supply where the water right was 
established; (2) where there is a change in place of use; and (3) 
where there is a change in purpose of use. Plaintiff cites no case 
in Utah, or cases from any other jurisdiction holding that a change 
application is necessary to convert an irrigation practice from 
flood type irrigation to a sprinkling system. We could not find 
one either. The Court can take judicial noticte of the fact that the 
application of water by a sprinkler system is decades old and is a 
widely used practice in the State and throughout the West. The 
fact that there have been no cases requiring a change application 
upon making this conversion is significant. 
The courts have also held that administrative interpretations 
of a statute by the agency charged with administering the statute 
is entitled to significant weight.16 Further, this Court has held 
that Courts can take judicial notice of the records of the State 
16
 Central Bank and Trust Co. v. Brimhall, 497 P.2d 638 
(Utah 1972); R.S. McKniqht v. St. Land Board, 381 P.2d 726 (Utah 
1963); Hotel Utah v. Industrial Commission, ill P.2d 200 (Utah 
1949); See also, Concerned Parents of Stepchildren v. Mitchel, 
645 P.2d 629, 633 (Utah 1982). See also, Lewis v. Martin, 397 
U.S. 552, 90 S.Ct. 1282, 25 L. Ed.2d 561 (1970); New York State 
Dept. of Social Services v. Dublino, 412 U.S. 405, 93 S.Ct. 2507, 
37 L. Ed.2d 688 (1973). 
13 
Engineer, even though not introduced in evidence. The change 
application form in current use by the State Engineer's office in 
paragraph 11, calls for information regarding the "purpose and 
extent of use." The purposes are listed as those recognized 
beneficial uses of water: Irrigation, stock watering, domestic, 
municipal, mining, power and other. We submit that irrigation is 
the purpose, nature or manner of use and that "purpose" of use is 
not changed when an irrigator converts from flood-type irrigation 
to the application of irrigation water through a pressurized 
sprinkler system. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff is not a lower water user from the same source of 
supply as defendant, but is instead the user and re-appropriator of 
defendant's waste and seepage water. Waste water may be re-
appropriated before it has returned to the stream from which it was 
originally diverted, and plaintiff can acquire a vested right as 
against those other water users of Alvey Wash. However, plaintiff 
can acquire no vested right as against the original appropriator so 
as to compel defendant to continue to waste this water for 
plaintiff's benefit. The law in Utah has been settled to this 
effect for 80 years and plaintiff offers no compelling reason for 
the Court to abandon this rule of law now. 
The conservation of water is not a new idea, and sprinkler 
irrigation is not a new technology that requires the wholesale 
Lehi Irr. Co. v. Jones, 115 Utah 136, 202 P.2d 892 (1949); 
and McGarry v. Thompson, 114 Utah 442, 201 P.2d 288 (1948). 
14 
abandonment of 80 years of established prededent. Sprinklers do 
conserve water and are more efficient. water users should be 
encouraged and rewarded for conservation by jretaining the right to 
reuse their waste water. That is the incest-ive required to make 
the substantial investment in conservation. To deprive defendant 
of the benefits of its efforts and expenditures would destroy any 
incentive to conserve and to make more efficient use of our scarce 
water supplies. It would be contrary to the public interest and 
the established public policy of this State, 
The trial court ruled correctly and thi£ Court was correct in 
affirming the trial court's decision. Plaintiff has presented 
nothing new that would warrant the rehearing Df this matter or the 
reconsideration of the Court's opinion. 
This matter is respectfully subpiit^ fecfl this day of 
November, 1992. 
Stevei^ 
CLYDE PRATT & f3NOW 
Attorneys for New Escalante 
Irrigation Company 
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